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Summary 
Developing countries have been hit by a fall in their terms of trade, 
high real interest rates on their external debt, and a drought in 
commercial lending from abroad. Their subsequent adjustment pack-
ages, often supported by loans from the IMF and World Bank, 
focused on a sharp real exchange rate depreciation to restore external 
balance and a host of microeconomic reforms to secure a simultaneous 
supply-side improvement. This paper examines the success of these 
'adjustment with growth' packages in a large sample of developing 
countries. 
We find these packages have been much more successful in LDCs 
which export manufactures than they have in those concentrating 
on primary exports (primarily low-income African countries); the 
latter have not resumed sustainable growth, and most of their external 
adjustment has arisen from expenditure reduction, not an increase 
in supply. The longer-term prospects for manufacturing exporters 
are also brighter: there we detect signs of increased efficiency and a 
smaller decline in investment than in primary exporters. But we 
also find that a high external debt burden and an unstable 
macroeconomic environment impede investment in all LDCs. In 
the longer term, adjustment with growth packages will succeed only 
if they are accompanied by a more stable macroeconomic environment 
and appropriate debt relief. 
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1. Introduction 
The developing countries have been in crisis since 1982. The combina-
tion of deteriorating terms of trade, rising real interest rates on their 
external debt and the drying up of commercial lending have forced 
them to pursue drastic economic adjustment policies. Faced with a sharp 
withdrawal of commercial bank funds that was only partly compensated 
by official lending, and unwilling to default, developing countries had 
to effect a positive transfer to developed countries. The crisis required 
a sharp adjustment: developing countries had to earn foreign exchange 
by exporting more or save it by importing less. It is now recognized 
that the brunt of adjustment fell on absorption, in particular on invest-
ment. In most developing countries, with the significant exception of 
East Asian countries, adjustment was achieved by cutting investment 
rather than by increasing saving. Both public and private investment 
fell. Admittedly, prior to 1982 many countries had embarked on overly 
ambitious investment programmes, partly because recycled petro-
dollars were all too readily available. Yet the fall in investment, par-
ticularly private investment, could have adverse implications for a 
sustained recovery. 
In response to the debt crisis, the IMF increased its lending, and the 
World Bank responded by introducing quick-disbursing adjustment 
loans to help countries achieve both macroeconomic equilibrium and 
efficient structural adjustment. In many quarters, the crisis was viewed 
as an opportunity to carry out much-needed microeconomic reforms 
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that would raise efficiency and allow adjustment to take place without 
a loss in growth despite the reduction in investment. 
Whatever the differences in the depth of the crises affecting them, 
most developing countries have now been undergoing structural adjust-
ment for almost a decade. What can be said overall about its success? 
In this paper, we evaluate adjustment packages by focusing on two key 
issues: did the sharp devaluation of the real exchange rate (advocated 
by international organizations) generate a supply response, and did 
microeconomic rationalization sufficiently raise the marginal efficiency 
of investment to compensate for the adverse effects of adjustment on 
the volume of investment? In other words, are there signs that the 
structural reforms are bearing fruit, and, if there is recovery, is it 
sustainable? 
We term real output growth sustainable if it exceeds population 
growth. Sustainability has assumed particular importance because the 
sharp drop in living standards that has accompanied adjustment pro-
grammes in many countries has created tensions that affect investment 
decisions. Is this uncertainty preventing investment in countries that 
would otherwise attract investment precisely because of the lower real 
wages? If investors are waiting to see whether economic conditions will 
deteriorate, then their expectations could become self-fulfilling, and 
could lead to the abandonment of otherwise well-conceived adjustment 
packages. 
To set the tone for our analysis, we need first to get a general sense 
of how adjusting countries are doing. Just as the severity of the crises 
differed widely across countries, so too has the burden of adjustment 
and its timing. No classification system for grouping countries can fully 
capture this diversity. Table 1 summarizes the latest available figures. 
Here we choose a country grouping based on economic structure: 
fuel exporters, manufacturing exporters, and, as a residual category, 
primary exporters. Period averages are taken for four macro-indicators: 
GDP growth, the share of investment in GDP, the ratio of debt service 
to exports and the real exchange rate. 
Three facts stand out. One is that only manufacturing exporters 
(mostly the East Asian countries) have resumed growth at pre-crisis 
levels. Although the debt-service burden of this group is high (partly 
because of a few Latin American countries in the grouping), it has 
stabilized. Growth among the fuel exporters has deteriorated through-
out the three periods. Primary exporters have recuperated most of their 
loss in growth, but they have not arrested a worsening trend in their 
external debt service. 
The second significant fact is the universal, and pronounced, decline 
in the investment share in GDP. For the non-fuel groups, the share has 
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Table 1. Macroeconomic indicators (annual averages, %) 
GDP growth 
Investment/GDP 
Debt service/exports 
Real exchange rate 
(1980=100) 
1978-81 
1982-86 
1986-88 
1978-81 
1982-86 
1986-88 
1978-81 
1982-86 
1986-88 
1978-81 
1982-86 
1986-88 
Primary 
exporters 
2.8 
1.4 
2.4 
21 
18 
17 
15 
20 
29 
103 
113 
139 
Manufacturing 
exporters 
4.8 
2.4 
4.9 
26 
23 
22 
25 
28 
29 
103 
112 
139 
Fuel 
exporters 
6.6 
2.0 
0.9 
28 
25 
19 
18 
25 
39 
100 
95 
135 
Notes: Unweighted averages of sample of 83 countries with population exceeding 1 mn. 
in 1980. Throughout the paper, an increase in the real exchange rate denotes a real 
exchange rate depreciation. 
fallen by about 20%, while for fuel exporters the decline was even 
sharper, reaching 30%. To be sure, it can be argued that the overly 
ambitious investment programmes following the oil boom needed to 
be scaled down. But the declines for the primary and manufacturing 
exporters are very high and may cause concern about the prospects for 
sustained recovery. 
The declining investment share in GDP and slower rate of growth, 
in spite of a sharp deterioration in the real exchange rate, is even more 
pronounced if we divide our sample of 83 countries into currently (i.e. 
in 1988) severely indebted countries and others. The 36 severely indeb-
ted countries had a decline in average growth from 3.1% per annum 
in 1978-81 to 2.5% in 1986-88 while the average share of investment 
in GDP fell from 22.3% in 1978-81 to 15.7% in 1986-88. For this 
severely indebted group of countries, the real exchange rate depreci-
ation was 46%. 
The third significant finding from Table 1 is the sharp real exchange 
rate depreciation. Six years into the cirisis, the real exchange rate had 
depreciated by close to 40% for all three country classifications. Some 
real exchange rate depreciation would have been required by any 
adjustment programme involving an increase in the net transfer from 
debtors to creditors, otherwise the required shift towards tradeable 
activities would not have materialized. 
But there is more behind this sharp and universal depreciation in 
the real exchange rate. When the IMF and World Bank stepped in 
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to fill at least some of the financing gap left by the withdrawal of 
commercial lending, they offered 'adjustment-with-growth' packages 
that relied heavily on a sharp depreciation of the real exchange rate as 
a condition for obtaining funds. The real exchange rate is an 
endogenous variable that can never be fully under a country's policy 
control, but it is no exaggeration to say that achieving a sharp real 
exchange rate depreciation was the centrepiece of these adjustment 
packages.1 
The failure of such a large number of countries to resume sustainable 
growth has given ammunition to the advocates of debt relief and to the 
critics of the adjustment-with-growth packages advocated by the IMF 
and the World Bank. The heavy emphasis on real exchange rate depreci-
ation as a way to restore external balance and elicit a significant supply 
response has been at the centre of this controversy about the effective-
ness of these packages. In the first part of the paper, we take a fresh 
look at the role of the exchange rate in the context of adjustment by 
distinguishing between the short-run supply effect of a real exchange 
rate depreciation and its long-run effect on growth of output through 
its impact on investment. 
In addition to the emphasis on a sharp depreciation of the real 
exchange rate, most adjustment packages introduced a host of pro-
ductivity-enhancing microeconomic reforms. Typically the reforms 
included a rationalization of public sector recurrent and investment 
expenditures; a restructuring of public enterprises; and trade, fiscal 
and credit policy reforms to provide more nearly neutral and trans-
parent incentives. While it is too early to see the full effects of micro-
economic reforms, one could hope to detect some effects in the form 
of a greater efficiency of investment. In the second part of the paper, 
we analyse the behaviour of investment during adjustment, looking 
first into the efficiency and cost of investment. Can one attribute most 
of the decline in private investment to the rising cost of capital goods? 
Did the efficiency of investment improve during adjustment? Because 
investment decisions are at least partially irreversible, we look into the 
influence of the macroeconomic environment, particularly the debt 
overhang, on investment decisions. 
In what follows, we address the evidence for a large sample of 
developing countries. In Section 2 we state succinctly the controversy 
surrounding the role of the real exchange rate in achieving external 
balance and restoring growth. Section 3 gives evidence on adjustment 
in the external balance and the supply-side effects of a real depreciation. 
I I 
1
 See Edwards (1989b) and World Bank (1988) for a description of IMF-/World Bank-supported 
adjustment packages. 
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Section 4 looks at the effects on investment of real depreciation and 
other factors. Conclusions and implications for a sustained recovery are 
discussed in Section 5. 
2. The controversy 
A standard framework for analysing the effects of adjustment program-
mes is the two-sector dependent-economy model with exogenous terms 
of trade. Consider the situation prevailing before the crisis. Before 
1981, many countries could run a trade deficit financed by external 
borrowing. When foreign borrowing was foreclosed or, at the least, 
greatly reduced, the absorption-income gap had to be reduced to reduce 
the current account deficit. (Many countries had to produce a trade 
surplus to service the increased payments on their external debt caused 
by higher real interest rates.) 
When resources are initially fully and efficiently employed, closing 
the absorption-income gap by reducing absorption is often referred to 
as the primary cost, or inevitable cost, of reducing a current account 
deficit. If closing the gap also entails a reduction in resource use because 
of relative price (or other) rigidities, there is also a secondary cost of 
adjustment. Over the medium term, adjustment policies to reduce the 
external deficit would include both expenditure-reducing and expen-
diture-switching policies (e.g. a real exchange rate depreciation). In 
addition, if the adjustment package is introduced at a time of inflation, 
a cutback in demand is desirable to reduce inflationary pressures. When 
resources are not fully or not efficiently employed one can also expect 
a supply response to a depreciation of the real exchange rate. 
The relative effectiveness of expenditure-reducing and expenditure-
switching policies depends on the marginal propensity to consume 
tradeables and on supply responsiveness. The lower the marginal 
propensity to consume tradeables, the less external adjustment will 
be obtained from a given demand reduction. And the more difficult 
it is to shift existing resources from non-tradeable to tradeable activi-
ties, the greater the required relative price shift (real exchange rate 
depreciation). 
To give some idea of the scope for substitution in demand, note that 
many countries, especially primary exporters, do not consume exports 
domestically. Also, close substitutes for imports are typically not available 
in the short to medium run. Data for a group of 40 developing countries 
indicates that the share of consumer good imports fell from 30% in 
1980 to 25% in 1987. Such a shift toward the inelastic component of 
total imports is likely to reduce the effectiveness of expenditure-
switching policies. 
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The traditional structuralist argument against devaluation is that it 
has a small impact on the trade balance because of low elasticities. This 
traditional argument has been buttressed by the contention that the 
redistributive mechanisms brought into play by devaluation (i.e., the 
shift from low savers to high savers) are contractionary from the demand 
side (Krugman and Taylor, 1977). Traditional stabilization packages 
reach the point of 'overkill' (Diaz-Alejandro, 1980; Dell, 1982) when it 
is further recognized that restrictive monetary policy may have a con-
tractionary effect on supply through higher interest costs (Cavallo, 1977; 
Bruno, 1979). 
These shortcomings did not go unnoticed within the international 
agencies. But it was not until the advent of adjustment lending in the 
early 1980s ($26 bn. from the IMF and $16 bn. from the World Bank 
during 1980-87) that these agencies made an explicit attempt to 
combine short-run stabilization goals with growth-oriented policies. In 
this new framework (see Corbo et al., 1987, and Thomas et ah, 1990), 
devaluation of the real exchange rate still played an essential role, not 
only to restore external balance but also to achieve a more efficient 
resource allocation: the positive supply response to a real devaluation 
would dominate its contractionary demand effects. 
This new emphasis on growth did not diminish the criticism, however. 
A 'new' structuralist critique pointed out that devaluation could be 
contractionary, this time from the supply side. The effect would come 
through the higher cost of imported inputs (Buffie, 1984); a lower 
volume of real credit (because of higher input prices with constant 
nominal credit) and consequently higher interest costs for firms (Van 
Wijnbergen, 1986); and, in the presence of widespread wage indexation, 
through higher labour costs. Finally, in the longer run, the negative 
effect on supply could be compounded if a real depreciation depressed 
investment because of a higher cost of imported capital equipment 
(Buffie, 1986). 
Consider the following back-of-the-envelope calculation of the con-
tractionary effects of a devaluation that increases the costs of intermedi-
ate inputs. For the countries in Table 1, the real exchange rate depreci-
ated by approximately 25% between 1980 and 1987. Assuming an 
economy-wide value-added ratio of 0.5, imported intermediates at 30% 
of total intermediates, and long-run demand and supply elasticities of 
1 and 2 respectively, the contractionary effect would be 5% of GDP. 
(In addition, the contractionary effects from the demand side could 
conceivably lead to excess supply among non-traded sectors.2) 
2
 Lizondo and Montiel (1989) give an exhaustive discussion of the various factors contributing to 
the contractionary effects of devaluation. Also see Edwards (1989a, chapter 8). 
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This 'new' critique assumes that a nominal devaluation results in a 
real devaluation on impact-as has been the case in the 1980s. The 
amount of the real devaluation will probably be less than the nominal 
devaluation, but it will be substantial, as the figures in Table 1 show. 
Over the longer term, as various studies have pointed out (e.g. Edwards, 
1989a), there is a tendency for the real devaluation to erode because 
of wage indexation and other factors. The critique remains worthy of 
closer investigation, however, in view of the pronounced depreciation 
in the real exchange rate apparent from Table 1 and the difficulties 
many countries have had in resuming growth. 
Finally, a related critique from the advocates of debt relief is that the 
resulting overkill from the extreme severity of adjustment programmes 
combined with a deteriorating external debt position has inhibited 
private investment. According to these critics, the debt overhang has 
acted as a tax on the proceeds of investment (Sachs, 1989) and uncer-
tainty has created negative incentives for private investment (Rodrik, 
1989; Dornbusch, 1988). As pointed out earlier, the criticism rests upon 
the consequences of uncertainty on the decision to invest in a world 
where the investment decision is at least partially irreversible. The 
argument here is that uncertainty about the future course of an adjust-
ment package will lead potential investors to adopt a wait-and-see 
attitude. In the typical Latin American case, flight capital will not be 
repatriated for investment because uncertainty about the outcome of 
the ongoing adjustment package is high. 
3. External adjustment and the real exchange rate 
Developing countries responded to the shocks of the 1980s by depreciat-
ing their real exchange rate.3 How effective has real exchange rate 
depreciation been? First, we analyse the evolution of the trade balance 
to see how much of the improvement in the trade balance was accounted 
for by real exchange rate depreciation after controlling for time trends 
and country-specific effects. Second, we look for evidence of supply 
response to the real exchange rate. 
For each of the three country groupings in Table 1, we pool countries 
and correlate the trade balance-GDP ratio with absorption, the real 
exchange rate, country dummies and a time trend. Unfortunately, 
3
 Real exchange rate depreciation was even stronger for recipients of World Bank/IMF adjustment 
loans. Thirty countries that did not receive adjustment loans with a major trade-reform com-
ponent depreciated in real terms by less than 2% between 1980-82 and 1985-87 whereas 40 
countries that received structural adjustment loans depreciated by 22% in real terms (see World 
Bank, 1988). 
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Table 2. Determinants of the trade balance 
(Dependent variable: the ratio of trade balance to GDP) 
Effect of 1 % increase in 
Real absorption 
Real exchange rate 
Real exchange rate in previous year 
Manufacturing 
exporters 
-0 .16 
(0.07) 
0.18 
(0.08) 
0.07 
(0.07) 
Fuel 
exporters 
-0.78 
(0.76) 
0.10 
(0.11) 
0.15 
(0.12) 
Primary 
exporters 
-0 .49 
(0.12) 
0.20 
(0.84) 
0.08 
(0.09) 
Notes: Estimated over 1965-85, excluding countries for which less than four observa-
tions. There are 20 manufaauring exporters, 11 fuel exporters and 18 primary 
exporters for which data is available. Standard errors of estimates shown in parenthesis. 
Equations estimated by instrumental variables using real money, and lagged values of 
absorption and the real exchange rate as instruments. Time trend and country-specific 
intercepts not reported. 
because of lack of data, we are unable to separate out directly the effects 
of demand switching and supply response. Results are reported in Table 
2. All coefficients for the real exchange rate are significant with the 
exception of that for fuel exporters, which is not surprising since 
natural-resource-based economies usually have price-insensitive supply 
structures. (Generally the lagged value of the real exchange rate is 
insignificant.) The coefficient on absorption is even more significant. 
For our sample, then, we conclude that the real exchange rate depreci-
ation contributed to improving the trade balance. 
We also re-estimated the same equation adding dummy variables for 
the post-1981 period on the coefficients of absorption and the real 
exchange rate. For the primary-exporter group a significantly negative 
value showed up for the real exchange rate dummy variable, suggesting 
no contribution of real exchange rate depreciation to trade balance 
improvements. This is consistent with other studies that have attempted 
to link the trade balance with the real exchange rate. 
It is interesting to measure the relative contribution of changes in 
absorption and of the real exchange rate to the trade balance. The 
index R = a2/ax (elasticity of the trade balance with respect to price/elas-
ticity of the trade balance with respect to absorption) measures the 
relative impact on the trade balance of a reduction in absorption and 
of a real depreciation. For our three country groupings, this index is 
1.13 for manufacturing exports, 0.13 for fuel exporters, and 0.41 for 
primary exporters. The exchange rate contributes to trade balance 
improvements most for manufacturing exporters. This is exactly what 
the 'old' structuralists would argue. For the rest of the developing world, 
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the relative effectiveness of expenditure-switching policies is very low 
indeed. Falling in this category are small low-income countries, which 
are at a relatively early stage of industrialization with a small and 
undiversified industrial sector. These countries have few opportunities 
for expanding exports, which are concentrated in a few primary com-
modities. The scope for export expansion is typically even more limited 
for natural-resource-based economies such as fuel exporters, although 
there may be room for adjustment on the import side if they have a 
larger share of consumer imports. These are the prototypical 'structural-
ist' economies (see Chenery, 1975; Taylor, 1982). 
One can also use the estimates in Table 2 to see how much of the 
improvement in trade balance was accounted for by real exchange rate 
depreciation after controlling for country-specific effects and the time 
trend. For manufacturing exporters (primary exporters) the average 
trade balance-GDP ratio was 4.9 (2.3) percentage points higher in 
1983-85 than in 1979-81. For manufacturing exporters real exchange 
depreciation accounted for a 2.1 percentage point improvement in the 
trade balance, while for primary exporters real exchange rate depreci-
ation only accounted for a 0.8 percentage point improvement. 
The limited scope for import substitution is also apparent from the 
evolution of the composition of non-fuel imports during the 1980s. 
The data (not shown here) indicates some import substitution in con-
sumer goods with a rising share of intermediate goods in imports. But 
since the share of consumer goods in total imports was already low at 
the onset of adjustment (about 20%), it is likely that little supply response 
could be expected from the replacement of imports with domestically 
produced substitutes for the majority of developing countries. 
Turn now to supply response. We assume that output supply at each 
point of time is a function of the capital stock, the cost of variable inputs, 
and, because adjustment takes time, of lagged supply. Because of lack 
of data for our large sample, we approximate the cost of variable inputs 
by the real exchange rate. This variable is also intended to proxy 
the costs of labour and, more importantly, the presumed supply-
augmenting effects of adjustment programmes based on real exchange 
rate depreciation. As before, dummy variables capture country-specific 
effects. The country-classification is unchanged. After taking a quasi 
first difference of the supply equation, one obtains the reduced form 
of Table 3. 
Interestingly, when it comes to the coefficient on the real exchange 
rate, one finds consistently a negative and significant contribution to 
supply (the lagged effects appear insignificant): a real depreciation 
(which increases our measure of the real exchange rate) reduces current 
output supply, other things equal. It must, of course, be recognized 
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Table 3. The real exchange rate and output supply 
(Dependent variable: logarithm of real output) 
Effect of 
1% increase in 
Output last year 
Output two years ago 
Real exchange rate 
Real exchange rate last year 
Real gross fixed investment 
Diagnostic statistics: 
Wald test 
Sargan test 
Fuel 
exporters 
0.44 
(0.15) 
-0 .04 
(0.07) 
-0 .10 
(0.04) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
0.12 
(0.03) 
477 
5.4 
Primary 
exporters 
0.31 
(0.07) 
0.07 
(0.03) 
-0.17 
(0.06) 
0.15 
(0.06) 
0.11 
(0.01) 
853 
4.6 
Manufacturing 
exporters 
0.21 
(0.11) 
0.13 
(0.05) 
-0.08 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
0.16 
(0.02) 
82 
0.9 
Notes: Maximum sample 1965-85, countries with less than four years data excluded. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. Estimated by instrumental variables, using as instru-
ments: world demand, real money, real GDP, real investment. The Wald test measures 
joint significance, the Sargan test the accuracy of the instrument set (see Arellano and 
Bond, 1988a). Both test statistics have five degrees of freedom. 
that our simple reduced form is certainly a short-cut way of trying to 
capture the supply-enhancing effects of a real depreciation. In terms 
of the framework developed earlier, the results in Table 3 suggest that 
the presumed resource-switching towards tradeables elicited by the 
massive real exchange rate depreciation involved at least a temporary 
output loss. In a world where factor specificity plays an important role, 
switching policies would be expected to lead to some resource idleness. 
It may well be that non-tradeable activities used factors not easily 
transferable to tradeable activities. Probably the real exchange rate 
variable also captures other adjustment effects associated with terms-of-
trade loss like lack of foreign exchange. Nonetheless, taken together, 
the results in Tables 2 and 3 give support, though perhaps only sug-
gestive, to the concerns raised by the structuralist critique. 
4. Investment, the real exchange rate and the debt overhang 
The sharp fall in the share of investment in GDP in developing countries 
(Table 1) does not bode well for a consolidation of adjustment achieve-
ments to date in the absence of a significant increase in the efficiency 
of investment. Lower investment not only reduces future productive 
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capacity, it also engenders lowered expectations for future growth. 
These expectations may be socially destabilizing. In addition, lower 
investment limits the scope for resource reallocation in response to 
reforms throughout the economy. Yet it is resource reallocation to the 
new set of incentives created by the reforms that is expected to play a 
crucial role in most adjustment-with-growth programmes. 
The disappointing investment rate in developing countries may be 
attributable to the extreme economic and financial distress of the most 
recent period, or it may be attributable to the design of adjustment 
policies. Two components of the adjustment-with-growth programmes 
may have been responsible for the investment slump. The first has to 
do with the effects of a real depreciation; the second with the micro-
economic reforms that were part of the conditionality provisions of the 
adjustment packages supported by the World Bank. Consider again the 
impact of a real depreciation. It has been argued (e.g. Blejer and Khan, 
1984), that the availability of foreign exchange exerts a powerful 
influence on investment both because it is needed to purchase mostly 
foreign-produced capital goods and because it may permit a less restric-
tive monetary policy. A real exchange rate depreciation is expected to 
promote investment by increasing the availability of foreign exchange. 
This may not happen, however, since a real exchange rate devaluation 
may substantially raise the real cost of capital goods (Buffie, 1984). 
The second way in which adjustment programmes may have con-
tributed to the slump in investment comes from the cut in public 
expenditures required by IMF stabilization programmes and by the 
strong public-sector management-reform component in World Bank 
structural adjustment programmes. Structural adjustment programmes 
aimed at restoring growth not only by rationalizing fiscal and financial 
incentives through economy-wide market and financial-sector reforms, 
but also by strengthening public-sector management. Many structural 
adjustment packages required a combination of divestiture of some 
public enterprises and a freeze on the creation of new ones and on 
employment levels in existing ones - in other words, a reduction in 
public-sector expenditure. It was hoped that private-sector investment 
would move in to replace public-sector investment and that, as a result 
of the policies aimed at rationalizing price incentives and reforming 
public-sector management, the overall marginal efficiency of investment 
would rise. 
To evaluate the proximate causes of the fall in the investment share 
in GDP, we collected time-series data on public-sector investment for 
a sample of 32 countries. The data can be used to provide a rough 
breakdown of total investment by public- and private-sector com-
ponents. The remainder of the paper is based on analysis of these data. 
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Table 4. Investment efficiency and the cost of capital 
(Annual averages, unweighted averages in country groups) 
Manufacturing Primary Developed 
exporters exporters countries 
70-74 75-82 83-86 70-74 75-82 83-86 70-74 75-82 83-86 
Investment/GDP 
private (%) 
public (%) 
total (%) 
private 
total 
ost of capital 
(1975-82 = 100) 
13 
6 
19 
1.1 
1.6 
54 
15 
8 
23 
2.1 
3.4 
100 
12 
7 
19 
1.9 
2.7 
233 
15 
6 
21 
1.3 
1.8 
38 
14 
7 
22 
1.5 
2.3 
100 
11 
6 
17 
1.5 
2.3 
158 
21 
4 
25 
2.1 
2.5 
76 
19 
4 
23 
2.2 
2.6 
100 
18 
3 
21 
1.9 
2.2 
152 
Notes: Developed country data for the G-7: US, UK, France, Germany, Japan, Italy 
and Canada. The incremental capital-output ratio is the ratio of real investment to real 
output growth. Real GDP growth is the denominator in both the private and total 
IGOR. Thus a higher total ICOR implies a lower efficiency of investment. The real 
cost of capital is measured by (nominal interest rate + depreciation rate — rate of price 
increase of investment goods) multiplied by the price of investment goods relative to 
the GDP deflator. 
4.1. Efficiency of investment and the cost of investment 
The longer-term trends (1970-86) of public and private investment 
rates are displayed by sub-period for the manufacturing and primary 
exporter groups in Table 4. Comparable trends for the G-7 countries 
are also provided as a reference. Broadly similar trends apply to 
developed and to developing countries. For all country groupings, 
private and public investment falls in the post-1982 period, and the 
cost-of-capital index rises. Fluctuations, however, are more pronounced 
for developing than for developed countries. 
For developing countries, four stylized facts emerge. First is an 
increase in the share of public investment during the period of 'easy' 
credit, when there was ample liquidity in the world capital markets 
following the first oil price rise. Second is a sharp downward shift in 
the share of private investment in GDP after the crisis, especially for 
primary exporters. Third is a steady increase in the real cost of capital. 
Fourth is a sharp swing in the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) 
for manufacturing exporters, with an improvement during 1983-86, 
when the ICOR fell and the efficiency of investment increased, whereas 
the ICOR for primary exporters remained stable. 
On the basis of these broad trends, one would be tempted to con-
clude that adjustment programmes were largely successful, at least 
for manufacturing exporters. For this group, the fall in public- and 
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private-sector investment was accompanied by an increase in the 
efficiency of total investment. It could also be argued that the reduction 
in the size of the public sector's capital expenditures weeded out the 
most inefficient investments and that the rationalization of public-sector 
investments raised the marginal efficiency of public investment. 
Also, by emphasizing the need for a real exchange rate depreciation, 
adjustment programmes compounded the increase in the cost of capital. 
It was hoped that the higher cost of capital would increase the efficient 
use of capital. And, helped by financial-sector reforms, distortions in 
factor prices favouring capital-intensive production techniques would 
be eliminated. In the final analysis, this means that the same growth 
rates can now be achieved with a smaller investment effort if the 
efficiency-augmenting effects are sufficiently strong. 
These findings and interpretations are at best suggestive, but certainly 
not conclusive. The fall in the I COR may reflect a higher rate of capacity 
utilization of a slowly increasing (or perhaps even shrinking) volume 
of capacity. It may also reflect a cutback of projects with long gestation 
lags (particularly public investment projects), or in investment in main-
tenance. In both cases the decline in the ICOR may not be sustainable 
and is likely to be reversed. Better information (like a breakdown of 
GDP into public- and private-sector components) would be needed for 
a sounder verdict.4 We can, however, go a bit further and verify whether 
the real exchange rate depreciation was a cause of the increase in the 
real cost of investment. We can also verify whether the major cause of 
the decline in private investment was the increase in the cost of invest-
ment or other factors such as depressed demand. 
We start with the cost of capital goods. Table 5 displays estimates of 
the elasticity of the relative price of capital goods in terms of the real 
exchange rate. The results show that a real exchange rate devaluation 
significantly increases the relative price of investment. The effect is 
stronger for manufacturing exporters than for primary exporters. At 
first sight this appears paradoxical. However, the result is less surprising 
when we consider that the share of construction in total investment is 
usually higher in lower-income countries (see Chenery, Syrquin and 
Robinson, 1986). In sum, the results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that our 
data are at least consistent with the 'new' structuralist critique, namely, 
that depreciation of the real exchange rate will have some contractionary 
4
 Because of the impossibility of distinguishing between the public- and private-sector components 
of GDP in our sample, the ICOR calculations in Table 4 are at best suggestive of trends in the 
efficiency of investment. Also, these rough calculations do not account for changes in capacity 
utilization. For alternative calculations that indicate an increase in the efficiency of investment 
during the 1980s see Easterly and Wetzel (1989). 
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Table 5. The real exchange rate and the relative price of investment goods 
(Dependent variable: logarithm of price of investment goods relative 
to the GDP deflator) 
Manufacturing exporters Primary exporters 
Effect of 1% devaluation 0.46 0.26 
(0.07) (0.07) 
Notes: Data and country classification as in Table 4. Estimated by instrumental variables, 
using lagged real exchange rate, real money, public investment and country intercepts 
as instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis. Country intercepts not reported. 
effects on supply in the medium to long term. Of course, the undesirable 
effects of these contractionary pressures must be balanced against any 
efficiency-enhancing effects resulting from less distortion in the cost of 
capital. 
We turn next to the causes of the decline in private investment. A 
contributing factor must have been the income loss that resulted from 
the combination of worsening terms of trade and higher debt-service 
payments. For the same group of countries as those in Table 1, Faini 
et al. (1990) estimate a loss in income of 2.5% of the average GDP be-
tween 1978-81 and 1982-86 (period averages). To sort out further the 
effects on private investment of demand-side shocks and of the cost of 
capital, we estimate a standard accelerator model in which the growth 
of absorption and the expected cost of capital are the main determinants 
of investment demand. The simplicity of the accelerator model makes 
it attractive for separating the effects on investment due to the combined 
effects of changes in the level of aggregate demand and changes in the 
expected cost of capital. We also examine whether the different 
components of the cost of capital (the real interest rate and the real 
price of investment goods) affect investment differently.5 Finally, we 
look for any significant impact on private investment of foreign 
exchange availability (measured as the sum of export receipts and 
non-monetary capital flows) and of public investment. 
As expected, private investment is positively related to real GDP 
growth and negatively related to the cost of capital (Table 6). The 
long-run elasticity of the investment rate with respect to the cost of 
capital is 0.16 for manufacturing exporters and 0.12 for primary expor-
ters. Foreign exchange availability exerts a positive, but statistically 
weak, impact for primary exporters and no effect at all for manufactur-
ing exporters. Public-sector investment never proved to be statistically 
I I 
5
 We also tested for a separate and/or different effect of the real exchange rate but found none. 
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Table 6. Investment determinants: output and substitution effects 
(Dependent variable: ratio of private investment to GDP) 
Effect of unit increase in 
Private investment/GDP, last year 
Output growth 
Output growth last year 
Capital cost last year 
Depreciation 
Depreciation last year 
Foreign exchange/GDP 
Diagnostic statistics 
Wald test 
Sargan test 
Manufacturing 
exporters 
0.61 
(0.11) 
0.12 
(0.06) 
-0 .06 
(0.03) 
-1 .43 
(0.46) 
84(4) 
56 (43) 
Primary 
exporters 
0.39 
(0.11) 
0.17 
(0.06) 
0.15 
(0.08) 
-0.07 
(0.03) 
-1 .03 
(0.46) 
-1.11 
(0.53) 
0.01 
(0.007) 
84(7) 
34 (59) 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Country intercepts not reported. 
Estimated by instrumental variables. Capital cost defined as (real interest 
rate + depreciation rate) multiplied by price of investment goods relative 
to GDP deflator. (Depreciation rate taken as 7% p.a.) Depreciation 
defined as depreciation rate times relative price of investment goods. 
Degrees of freedom in parenthesis. 
significant in any of the equations. Our data were unable to detect any 
significant complementarity (or substitutability) between public and 
private investment once we control for the real interest rate and the 
cost of capital. This may be because our data did not distinguish between 
investment in infrastructure and investment by public enterprises. 
It is instructive to apply the estimates in Table 6 to the investment 
and cost-of-capital figures of Table 4 to calculate the portion of the 
decline in investment between 1975-82 and 1983-85 accounted for by 
variations in the cost of capital. This estimate is obtained by multiplying 
the long-run elasticity of investment with respect to the various com-
ponents of the cost of capital by the change in the average value of 
these components between the two periods. The calculation indicates 
that only a relatively small fraction of the fall in private investment is 
attributable to increases in the cost of capital, even for manufacturing 
exporters, where investment is more sensitive to changes in the cost of 
capital. We find that 34.6% of the decline in private investment is 
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attributable to increases in the cost of capital. Comparable figures for 
primary exporters are 24.2% of private investment. We, therefore, 
conclude that the output (and other) effects were a more important 
contributing factor to the decline in investment than the substitution 
effect. 
4.2. Investment and the debt overhang 
While the accelerator model is useful for sorting out the contribution 
of demand shocks and of changes in the cost of capital, the calculations 
presented above suggest that other factors must have played an impor-
tant role in explaining the recent dramatic decline in investment among 
developing countries. To explore these other factors, we now turn 
to a forward-looking approach to the investment decision. Clearly, 
entrepreneurs consider the future before committing long-term resour-
ces to production, basing their decision on their expectations about the 
future path of the main determinants of the investment's return. 
In a context where investment is at least partially irreversible once 
capital is installed, the decision to invest is intrinsically tied to the level 
of uncertainty about the future evolution of the economy. A high level 
of uncertainty will reduce the propensity to invest: it increases the 
possibility that highly productive capacity installed today will be of no 
use tomorrow if economic conditions deteriorate sharply. Under these 
circumstances, entrepreneurs would prefer to wait for the uncertainty 
to dissipate rather than make the decision to invest today. In turn, 
low investment today increases the probability of economic deterio-
ration tomorrow, making the initial prophecy self-fulfilling (Rodrik, 
1989). The economy becomes trapped in an inefficient, low-investment 
equilibrium. 
This outcome is not simply a theoretical quibble. The scenario we 
have just sketched matches the situation in many developing countries, 
where the debt overhang and widespread symptoms of adjustment 
fatigue provide a gloomy outlook for the recovery of private investment. 
A recent World Bank report (1988) concludes that the long-run sustain-
ability of the adjustment effort is threatened by low investment rates, 
persistent debt overhang, worsening income distribution and burgeon-
ing fiscal deficits. Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that 
forward-looking entrepreneurs are quite reluctant to sink resources 
into nearly-irreversible activities. 
To model the forward-looking nature of the investment decision, we 
assume that the representative firm is constrained by a putty-clay 
technology and operates in an imperfectly competitive output market. 
(The model is derived in the appendix.) Production techniques are 
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Table 7. Investment and the macroeconomic environment 
(Dependent variable: the adjusted ICOR) 
Investment 
increase in 
Debt/exports 
(Debt/exports) x (value ICOR) 
Value ICOR 
Real exchange rate, last year 
(Real exchange rate, last year) > 
Foreign exchange/GDP 
: (value ICOR) 
(Foreign exchange/GDP) x (value ICOR) 
Private 
1.01 
(0.21) 
-0.74 
(0.15) 
2.74 
(0.35) 
-2.56 
(1.07) 
3.00 
(0.90) 
-1.11 
(0.69) 
-0.10 
(0.38) 
Total 
1.34 
(0.62) 
-0.40 
(0.28) 
2.17 
(0.60) 
-2.66 
(1.91) 
2.60 
(0.87) 
-2.76 
(0.84) 
0.11 
(0.34) 
Notes: Sample pools manufacturing and primary exporters. Standard errors in 
parenthesis, country intercepts not reported. The adjusted ICOR at time t is 
defined as 
(q IC/p)t - (1 - d)l(\ + r)t(q IC/p)l+1 
where q is the price of investment goods, p the GDP deflator, IC the ICOR, d 
the depreciation rate and r the real interest rate. The value ICOR is simply 
(qlClp). 
flexible ex ante but, once chosen, they cannot be changed in response 
to subsequent variations in factor prices. Capital-.market imperfections 
are summarized by an agency cost function in which a high leverage is 
associated with higher costs for the firm. Only debt and retained earn-
ings are available as sources of investment finance. Finally, we dispense 
with the assumption that the interest rate and the entrepreneur's dis-
count rate are identical. Market imperfections prevent such equaliz-
ation. The risk premium (i.e., the difference between the discount rate 
and the interest rate) is assumed to be a function of the macroeconomic 
environment. The resulting first-order condition (see the appendix) 
relates the quasi-forward difference in the marginal capital-output ratio 
(multiplied by the ratio of the investment to the output deflators) to 
the determinants of the risk premium. 
This framework is convenient for investigating whether variables 
such as the debt ratio, foreign exchange availability, the real exchange 
rate and public investment have a significant bearing on the investment 
decision through their impact on the macroeconomic environment. 
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Table 8. Investment and macroeconomic stability 
(Dependent variable: country-specific fixed effects of investment in Table 7) 
Total Private 
investment investment 
Constant 1.69 1.45 
(0.29) (0.21) 
Standard deviation of real exchange rate —0.30 —0.15 
(0.12) (0.09) 
Notes: OLS cross section on 20 countries, standard errors in parenthesis. 
Estimation of the optimality condition helps isolate the effect of the 
macroeconomic environment on investment by controlling for the more 
direct impact that these variables have on investment through other 
channels such as the cost of capital. 
We estimate this model for a smaller sample that combines manufac-
turing and primary exporters. Table 7 indicates several important 
results. First, an increase in the debt-export ratio is associated with a 
lower propensity to invest, possibly because of a higher risk premium. 
Second, a depreciated real exchange rate and a greater availability of 
foreign exchange both promote investment. 
We also investigated whether the debt-export ratio became more 
significant during the crisis period. Tests for in-sample stability show 
that the debt-export ratio has a significantly higher coefficient after 
1982. 
The picture that emerges from these estimates is that the macro-
economic environment is likely to have had a significant impact on 
investment. The sample of 20 countries is smaller than one would wish 
ideally, and the assumption of continuous optimization by agents is a 
strong one. Yet the results support the often-heard contention that a 
credible macroeconomic environment is a prerequisite for a sustainable 
recovery. 
Further support for this hypothesis is given in Table 8, which reports 
the results of regressing the fixed country effects of Table 7 on the 
standard deviation of the real exchange rate, <r. If fluctuations in the 
real exchange are a good proxy for macroeconomic instability, then 
the results in Table 8 confirm the view that investment responds 
positively to a stable macroeconomic environment.6 Taken together, 
6
 The sample is the same as that in Tables 4-6 except that countries with negative ICORs have 
been eliminated. 
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the results in Tables 7 and 8 suggest that the state of the macro-
economic environment explains much of the cross-country variation in 
investment.7 
5. Looking ahead 
Six years into the crisis that hit developing countries, three facts stand 
out. First, only manufacturing exporters have resumed growth to pre-
crisis levels and stabilized their debt-service burden. Second, the invest-
ment share in GDP has declined substantially. Third, the real exchange 
rate has depreciated sharply, by about 40% compared with its level 
around 1980. Arguably, a sharp real exchange rate depreciation was 
called for by the need to service higher interest payments. However, a 
substantial depreciation was also clearly at the heart of the adjustment-
with-growth packages supported by the IMF and World Bank. 
Complemented by microeconomic reforms for rationalizing incen-
tives and by other measures aimed at mobilizing resources, depreciation 
of the real exchange rate was expected to help remove long-standing 
distortions in factor markets that favoured capital-intensive projects 
and distortions in goods markets that penalized the produrtion of 
tradeables, notably exports. The evidence shows that for most countries, 
adjustment occurred mainly through a reduction in expenditures. To 
say the least, the econometric evidence is certainly consistent with 
structuralist arguments that real depreciation elicits little supply 
response in the short run. 
A sustainable recovery requires that income growth exceed popula-
tion growth. For low-income countries, population growth is around 
2% a year. Per capita income growth was still negative during 1986-88 
for fuel exporters and positive but less than 0.5% for primary exporters. 
These countries have not yet achieved sustainable recovery in the strong 
sense of a growth in per capita income of 1% or more a year. Since 
adjustment also worsened income distribution in many countries 
because of the combination of capital flight and plummeting real wages, 
a sustainable recovery has not yet been achieved. 
Yet there is evidence that sustainable growth may be within reach if 
productivity-raising microeconomic reforms can be sustained long 
enough. This has been clearly demonstrated by the successful adjust-
ment experience of the East Asian countries during the recent crisis 
and the spectacular increases in total factor productivity growth they 
7
 Alesina and Tabellini (1989) analyse the effects of macroeconomic instability in terms of political 
decisions. 
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achieved during a 20-year period of outward orientation. The calcula-
tions presented in this paper show signs, in the form of a higher 
efficiency of investment, that productivity is rising. However, up to now, 
this effect has been quantitatively small. We also show that only a small 
part of the decline in investment can be accounted for by the substitution 
effect arising from the higher cost of investment associated with the 
sharp real exchange rate depreciation. We therefore conclude that in 
spite of some investment efficiency improvements, especially among 
manufacturing exporters, much of the decline in private investment 
must be accounted for by factors other than the cost of capital. The 
impact of lower investment on growth was significant. Indeed, if one 
applies end-of-period ICORs to the estimated elasticities of investment 
with respect to the real cost of capital, one finds a yearly loss in growth 
of 1.8% for primary exporters and 1.1% for manufacturing exporters 
from the lower investment levels that is not caused by a higher cost of 
capital. 
The decline in real income caused by the unfavourable external 
environment also contributed to the decline in private investment. 
However, the evidence also supports the contention that, in a world 
where capital is at least partially sunk once installed, uncertainty about 
the future course of the economy will lead investors to wait. Econometric 
evidence from a forward-looking model of investment behaviour shows 
that investment was negatively related to debt and foreign exchange 
availability indicators. Therefore, contrary to what has often been asser-
ted, debt relief would raise investment as well as consumption. Evidence 
was also found that investment was negatively affected by real exchange 
variability, a proxy for macroeconomic instability. 
Two lessons emerge for the design of adjustment programmes. First, 
in low-income, primary-exporting countries the large real exchange 
rate devaluation that is central to the adjustment-with-growth strategy 
may not be effective for a number of reasons. These include the 
attendant rise in the cost of (mostly) imported capital inputs and the 
general lack of supply-responsiveness to the real exchange rate depreci-
ation. Second, the microeconomic reforms that have been at the heart 
of many recent adjustment packages may not bear fruit if there is 
uncertainty about the sustainability of the stabilization effort. Investors 
will wait for the uncertainty surrounding a stabilization programme to 
be resolved, and low investment, in turn, will increase the probability 
of future economic deterioration. Under these circumstances, there is 
a high pay-off for achieving macroeconomic stability by taking appropri-
ate measures for partial debt relief and postponing microeconomic 
reforms if successful implementation is jeopardized by the uncertainty 
investors feel about the economy. At the same time, the use of funds 
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available from debt relief should be monitored so as to improve the 
position of both the creditors and the debtors. As argued by Sachs 
(1989) and by Claessens and Diwan (1990), debt relief should come 
with enhanced conditionality to provide the country with the incentive 
to adjust and, perhaps more crucially, to avoid the resumption of 
unsustainable macroeconomic policies. 
Discussion 
Richard Baldwin 
Columbia Business School, NBER and CEPR 
This paper examines the adjustment of developing countries (LDCs) 
to the external shocks of the 1980s. The size and scope of the sample 
are impressive. The authors use a variety of empirical techniques to 
shed light on the effects on aggregate supply and investment of two 
typical components of adjustment packages: significant real exchange 
rate depreciation and microeconomic reforms. 
Table 1 studies the determinants of the trade balance. Although the 
authors are careful to draw only weak conclusions from the evidence, 
it is worthwhile pointing out some problems with these findings. Con-
sider briefly the theory behind this regression. An accounting identity 
together with a semi-log approximation imply that: 
( ^ ) = « + (-!) 1" At + \nGDPt + yt 
where y is the approximation error. Assuming that GDP is a function 
of the real exchange rate gives us the Table 1 equation. Theory tells 
us that the coefficient on In A should be exactly minus one; the fact 
that the estimates are consistently greater suggests that the instrumental 
variables have not fully dealt with the simultaneity problem. For in-
stance, a Keynesian relationship between demand and output could 
account for the estimated coefficients. If lower demand lowered output 
as well as improving the trade balance, the coefficient on In A would 
be upward biased. The fact that the estimate is consistently too high 
casts doubt on the estimation procedure; all the estimates are likely to 
reflect the impact of the RER. Since the coefficients are all undoubtedly 
biased it is probably best to think of them as multiple-correlation 
coefficients. We can therefore say no more than that depreciations are 
positively correlated with trade-balance improvement in this sample. 
Table 2 does not shed any light on whether this comes from the 
contractionary effects of devaluation on demand or its impact on aggre-
gate supply. 
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The easiest way to avoid confounding supply and demand consider-
ations is directly to estimate the impact of RER on output as is done in 
Table 3. Here we see that in fact devaluations are correlated with lower 
output; they appear to have a negative supply effect. Of course, as the 
authors mention, it is difficult to interpret even the signs of coefficients 
in such a simple estimation of the GDP function. 
The evidence in Table 4 suggests that adjustment programmes have 
improved the aggregate efficiency of LDCs' investment. But since the 
private ICOR of developed countries (DCs) improved as much as that 
of the LDCs it is not at all evident that the improvement can be attributed 
to the adjustment programmes. And although the LDCs' public ICOR 
improved more than the DCs', this may again be for a large number 
of reasons. In particular, since the improvement is for only four years, 
1983-86, it is very possible that this represents a reduction of public 
investment which does not directly contribute to GDP, rather than a 
weeding out of inefficient projects. For example, postponing mainten-
ance on roads and bridges, reduced education expenditures and elimi-
nation of long-term public health projects would tend to boost the public 
ICOR yet may not represent efficiency gains. 
The most convincing evidence in the paper is presented in Table 7. 
The regression results are for a well-specified model of the investment 
decision. The table presents evidence that devaluation promotes in-
vestment, yet a greater debt-to-export ratio discourages investment. 
Although this is not directly related to the effects of depreciation and 
microeconomic reforms on supply, it does address an important issue. 
It suggests that a sustainable macroeconomic environment is important 
for growth and that acquiring debt to stabilize the economy may be a 
self-defeating policy. 
Charles Bean 
London School of Economics 
This stimulating and provocative paper seeks to marshall econometric 
evidence from a panel of developing countries on the wisdom or 
otherwise of the 'adjustment with growth' packages forced on many of 
them over the last decade. While I have sympathy with many of the 
arguments the authors advance, the econometric results are sometimes 
not as convincing as one would like, and their case might usefully have 
been buttressed by case studies of individual countries. 
My first comment is perhaps more appropriately directed at the IMF 
and the World Bank than at the authors of this paper. A key feature 
in these adjustment packages has been real exchange rate depreciation, 
and Faini and de Melo follow this line of thinking by treating the real 
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exchange rate as a largely exogenous variable under the control of the 
authorities. But how are such real depreciations achieved? In the short 
run a monetary relaxation i.e. a nominal devaluation/depreciation, will 
do the trick, but in the medium term one would expect the consequent 
improvement in competitiveness to be whittled away as domestic wages 
and prices adjust. In the long run a real exchange rate depreciation 
can be sustained only if it is accompanied by other real changes such 
as a fiscal contraction or a successful incomes policy. The effect on the 
economy will differ depending on the nature of the supporting policies 
(the latter is supply enhancing; the former is generally not), and the 
authors fail to control for this. 
Turning next to the results of Tables 2 and 3 in Section 3, I must 
confess to some unease at the rather cavalier treatment of the question 
of identification, with the real money supply, surely an endogenous 
variable, playing a major instrumental role. Faini and de Melo admit 
that they cannot sort out whether their trade balance equation reflects 
demand switching or a supply response. But I do not see why their 
supply equation should be any more successfully identified, especially 
since for lack of data it omits important supply-side variables such as 
the capital stock and own-product wages (for which the real exchange 
rate seems likely to be a poor proxy). This may not matter too much 
if the equations are used for reduced form 'historical accounting' 
exercises such as those to which the trade balance equation is put, but 
should make one wary of making policy recommendations based on an 
assumed channel of response. 
The discussion of the adverse effect of a real exchange depreciation 
on the cost of capital and thence investment provides an interesting 
counterpart to the literature on European unemployment which has 
identified the terms of trade deterioration following OPEC I and II as 
a potential source of wage pressure and adverse supply-side develop-
ments in the 1970s and early 1980s. However, the results suggest that 
increases in the cost of capital account for only a third (quarter) of the 
decline in private investment in manufacturing (primary) exporters. 
Since virtually all of the action comes from variations in the real interest 
rate rather than the price of capital goods (see Table 4), it would appear 
that the impact on investment of the real depreciations via the cost of 
capital is essentially negligible. 
The authors then go on to consider a more structural model of 
investment in which the impact of the macroeconomic environment 
can be more directly assessed. Although the main text makes much of 
the effect of uncertainty and irreversibility in leading to a 'wait-and-see' 
attitude on the part of entrepreneurs, the model of the appendix does 
not explicitly incorporate this feature (it is in fact valid only under point 
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expectations). Instead there is an ad hoc risk premium which depends 
on macroeconomic variables such as the debt-export ratio and the 
availability of foreign exchange. The results in Table 7 suggest that 
these variables are statistically important. Unfortunately, because the 
estimated equation is an intertemporal optimality condition it is not 
easy to gauge their quantitative significance, which requires solving the 
full optimization problem facing the entrepreneur. It would have been 
useful if the authors had given the reader some guidance here. 
Finally, the discussion sometimes confuses the issue of macro-
economic uncertainty with the question of the credibility of economic 
policies (when the reader is told, for example, that the results 'support 
the often-heard contention that a credible macroeconomic environment 
is a prerequisite for a sustainable recovery'). A set of announced policies 
can be completely 'incredible' i.e. unsustainable, and consequently the 
path of future policy instruments entirely predictable. By contrast a set 
of announced policies can be 'credible' i.e. sustainable, but there can 
be considerable uncertainty about whether the government will actually 
stick to them. Identifying an adjustment programme that is both credible 
and successful is child's play ex post; identifying it ex ante is another 
matter entirely! 
General discussion 
Many panelists focused on the difficulty of interpreting regression 
equations at this degree of aggregation. In particular, it was hard to 
know how best to capture the effect of uncertainty: Jean-Paul Lambert 
thought that some measure of the variability of export prices might 
be more appropriate for many primary commodity exporters. Horst 
Siebert pointed out that microeconomic determinants of uncertainty 
(such as the probability of expropriation) had been changing sig-
nificantly in many countries during the period under consideration. 
He also thought it important to control explicitly for unanticipated 
changes in fiscal and monetary policy. Daniel Cohen was unhappy with 
the interpretation given to the debt-export ratio, which could represent 
many different influences on investment. 
There was some discussion also of policy implications. David Newbery 
pointed out that primary commodity exporters faced a serious difficulty: 
if the elasticity of demand for their products was less than unity, an 
expansion of exports along the lines demanded in structural adjustment 
programmes might lead to their becoming worse off overall. Paul 
Seabright suggested that devaluation meant very different things for 
primary commodity and for manufactured exporters: for the former, 
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a devaluation would have little effect on the foreign currency price of I 
their exports but would change mainly the relative domestic price of 1 
tradeables and non-tradeables; it was unsurprising that dramatic effects 1 
were hard to find in the short term. For manufactured exporters, J 
however, devaluations changed the prices of their goods relative to j 
competing products and could be expected to yield appreciably greater J 
results in the short term. 5 
Appendix. A forward-looking model of investment 
The representative firm is assumed to be constrained by a putty-clay 
technology and to operate in an imperfectly competitive output market. 
Imperfections in capital markets constrain the financing choice of the 
firm. There is no well-functioning stock market. There are, as a result, 
only two sources of finance: (short-term) debt and retained earnings. 
Entrepreneurs discount future returns at a rate, i, which is assumed 
to be larger than the risk-free interest rate, r (otherwise firms would 
accumulate financial assets). Therefore, debt is the privileged source 
of finance (perhaps also because of its favoured tax status). However, 
an internal solution to the optimal debt decision is obtained by assuming 
that higher outstanding debt relative to the firm's capital is associated 
with increasing agency costs. 
The firm's problem can be written as: 
m a x £ ( j T i ) IP*(Q')Q'~ W<N>-qJt + Bt-Bt-X 
-rlBt-,-A[(Bt,p,C)Qt)] (Al) 
s.t. 
G= I (l-Sr%f(kv)/kv (A2) 
v = t—L 
Nt= I (l-dy-'IJkv (A3) 
vt-L 
where Q,, N,, and It represent output, employment and investment, 
respectively, pt(Qt) is the inverse demand function, and w, and q, are 
labour and investment costs, respectively. On the financial side, r, is the 
risk-free interest rate and A(B„ pt(')Qt) with Ax > 0, A2 < 0 and Au > 0 
is the agency cost function. Equations (A2) and (A3) define the produc-
tion and the labour demand function for a putty-clay technology, where 
L is the average life of capital goods, S denotes their depreciation rate, 
and f(kv) and kv represent the ex ante production function (in intensive 
form) and the capital-labour ratio. 
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The first-order conditions for output and debt are: 
1 - 5 
g(Qt, W O - T — : g(qt+i, wt+1) = MR, -MR,A2 (A4) 
1 + i 
(l + i ) ( l - i 4 i ) - ( l + r) = 0 (A5) 
where MR, denotes marginal revenue and g{ ) is an increasing function 
of factor prices (Nickell, 1979). The function g represents the present 
discounted value over a lifetime of marginal costs of installed capacity 
for a machine after allowing for depreciation. At an optimum, the cost 
of an extra unit of capacity today is equated to marginal revenue plus 
the discounted saving of not having to install more capacity tomorrow. 
The variable w represents the present discounted value of labour costs 
over the lifetime of a machine. Even after parameterizing the agency 
cost function and the ex ante production function, one cannot estimate 
(A4) since w is not observable. We can, however, substitute out for w 
by using the first-order condition for kv (not reported in the text), which 
relates the marginal rate of substitution between labour and capital in 
the ex ante production function to qjwt. We find that g{ ) — q,lf{k,). 
For the purpose of estimation, we assume that f(k,) is Cobb-Douglas 
and A( ) is quadratic, i.e.: 
A(B„p,( )Qt) 
-•4<slr PtQ, (A6) 
Substitution and manipulations yield: 
q,IC, 1 - 8 q,+1IC,+l 
Pt l + ir P,+i 
=
 ( £
~
1 ) Q ! [ l / 2o ( i - r)2/(l + if+ l+ac /2] (A7) 
e 
where ICt denotes the incremental capital-output ratio, ir is the real 
interest rate, [l + ir = (l + i)p,/pt+i] and e and a represent the price 
elasticity of demand and the capital elasticity of output, respectively. 
The right-hand side of (A7) is equal to MR,{\— A2) after substituting 
from (A5) and (A6) and multiplying by alp,. To interpret the left-hand 
side of (A7) notice that a large value of IC indicates a relatively more 
capital-intensive technique on the latest vintage which in turn must be 
attributed, for a given q, to a relatively high level of w, i.e. of the present 
discounted value of labour costs over the lifetime of machine. As a 
result the present value of marginal costs associated with a machine 
(the function g( )) will be also large and lead, as indicated by (A4), to 
a lower capacity output. For a given value of S, (A7) could have been 
518 Riccardo Faini and Jaime de Melo 
estimated had we assumed that i = r. Suppose though that 1 + i = 
(l + r)(l + p), where p is a multiplicative risk premium that depends 
on the macroeconomic environment. Multiply (A7) by 1 + p and bring 
the unobservable terms from the left-hand to the right-hand side. We 
then assume that p can be expressed as a function of the state of the 
macroeconomic environment. 
Equation (A7) provides the basis for estimation. We experiment over 
different values of 5. Notice that if p is not equal to zero, then the 
lagged value of q(IC/p) should belong on the right-hand side of the 
equation. Fixed-effect estimation under these circumstances would be 
problematic: the speed of convergence is a function of the number of 
observations per country. To circumvent this problem, we rely on a 
modified Anderson-Hsiao (1982) procedure. To eliminate the fixed 
effect, we take first differences of the original equation. By doing so, 
however, the error term, if it was white noise to begin with, is transfor-
med into a first-order unit-root moving average process which is corre-
lated with the first difference oiq(IC/p). Therefore, we use an (efficient) 
instrumental variable procedure by exploiting all the orthogonality 
restrictions between the error term and q(IC/p),-i where i> 1. This 
generalized method of moments estimator was implemented in the 
DPD programme developed by Arellano and Bond (1988b). 
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